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Objective: To estimate the infection curve of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) using the back
projection method and to assess the effectiveness of interventions.
Design: Statistical method.
Data: The daily reported number of SARS and interventions taken by Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (HKSAR) up to 24 June 2003 are used.
Method: To use a back projection technique to construct the infection curve of SARS in Hong Kong. The
estimated epidemic curve is studied to identify the major events and to assess the effectiveness of
interventions over the course of the epidemic.
Results: The SARS infection curve in Hong Kong is constructed for the period 1 March 2003 to 24 June
2003. Some interventions seem to be effective while others apparently have little or no effect. The infections
among the medical and health workers are high.
Conclusions: Quarantine of the close contacts of confirmed and suspected SARS cases seems to be the
most effective intervention against spread of SARS in the community. Thorough disinfection of the infected
area against environmental hazards is helpful. Infections within hospitals can be reduced by better
isolation measures and protective equipments.
T
he severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic
poses one of the most serious global health threats since
AIDS because of its infectiousness and its potential to
spread through air travel. The contagiousness and lethality of
SARS is of great concern. Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (HKSAR) as at 24 June 2003 has had 1755 infected
cases with 296 fatalities. This has posed a serious threat to
the existing health care system and has serious implications
to future infectious disease control. During the course of the
epidemic, the HKSAR government has implemented various
preventive measures and interventions to fight against the
epidemic outbreak. In this paper, ‘‘preventive measures’’ and
‘‘interventions’’ are used interchangeably to refer to actions
taken to curb the spread of the epidemic either in the general
population or in some specific groups.
There seems to be lack of a quantitative method to justify
the effectiveness on a population level of preventive measures
and interventions taken. Monitoring changes in the number
of infections over the course of the epidemic provides some
insight on the effectiveness. However, the number of
infections is unobservable, while the available information
on the number of reported cases, because of the disease
incubation period, is not sensitive enough to reflect the
immediate effect of the preventive measures. It requires very
prompt and decisive actions to be taken in monitoring a new
emerging epidemic. There is need to construct the infection
curve in assisting to evaluate the effectiveness of intervention
measures. We propose the use of the back projection method
to construct the SARS infection curve instead of tracing the
patients’ contact history as in Chan-Yeung and Yu.1 The case
study method is helpful, but it is not efficient because
detailed individual contact histories are usually unavailable
and/or unreliable. In addition, the infection curve estimated
by case study method subjects to individual fluctuations.
The estimated infection curve from the back projection
method smoothes these fluctuations so that the infection
waves can be clearly identified over the course of the
epidemic.
The back projection technique2 is widely used in modelling
the spread of HIV/AIDS. As SARS involves progression from
infection, incubation, and to onset of symptoms, the back
projection technique also can be applied to this epidemic. In
HIV/AIDS epidemic, the estimated total number of infections
is valuable as it gives information on how many unobserved
infected people are circulating in the community. Though the
incubation time is relatively much shorter in SARS epidemic,
the estimated unobserved daily number of infections over the
course of the epidemic provides useful information on the
effectiveness of any interventions and preventive measures.
METHOD
Data
The daily reported number of SARS cases is obtained from
the Department of Health of the HKSAR.3 There have been
1755 cases up to 24 June 2003. The data for 10 April 2003 and
11 April 2003 show an abnormal pattern with 28 and 61
reported cases, respectively. It is suggested that a reporting
delay occurred in the previous day, and some of the cases
reported on 11 April 2003 should be counted as the cases on
10 April 2003.4 For this reason, an average of the two days are
used in the analysis, 44 and 45 cases for the two days
respectively.
The back projection method
Daily reported cases are used. Let t = 1, 2,…,t be the time
units (that is, days) for the data. It is assumed that before 1
March 2003, the epidemic had not yet appeared, this is
denoted as t = 1. Although there might be sparse cases
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Abbreviations: SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome; HKSAR,
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
766
www.jech.com
 on 29 January 2007 jech.bmj.comDownloaded from 
infected before this date, the current data do not provide any
information on the early cases. Therefore, 1 March 2003 is
assumed to be the start of the epidemic. The latest time when
data are available for analysis is 24 June 2003, and thus t is
set to 116. The daily mean number of reported cases of SARS
(mt) can be expressed in terms of the daily mean number of
SARS infection (ls, s = 1,…, t) by the convolution equation.
where fd,s is the probability that an infected individual is
admitted to hospital (reported) after a period of length d
starting from time s. As suggested in Donnelly et al,5 an
infected person will go through two periods: from infection to
onset of clinical symptoms and from onset of clinical
symptoms to admission to hospital. The infection to onset
time is assumed to follow a c distribution with a mean 6.37
(SD = 4.09). The onset to admission time is assumed to
follow a c distribution with mean (SD) 4.85 (3.49), 3.83
(2.45) and 3.67 (3.27) for different time periods over the
course of the epidemic. Hence, fd,s can be expressed as:
where gd is the distribution of the infection to onset time
(assumed independent to the starting time) and hd,t is the
onset to admission time starting in time t. Estimates of the
daily number of infection can be obtained using the EMS
algorithm: for details of the method see Becker et al6 and
Chau et al.7 For each time point, a point wise 95% confidence
interval for the incidence is constructed by bootstrap
procedure.8
RESULTS
Figure 1 gives the estimated mean number of SARS
infections for each day from 1 March 2003 to 24 June 2003
and its point wise 95% confidence intervals. The cumulative
number of SARS infections over this period is estimated to be
1755. All the infected cases have been diagnosed and known.
It appears that there are four major infection waves over the
course of the epidemic outbreak. The size of the second wave
is the largest. After the fourth wave, it seems that the
epidemic has been contained. Only residual effects were
detected in the remaining of the period. Zero infections have
been estimated for the period after 30 May 2003.
The back projection method usually gives imprecise
estimates for the recent past. However, the estimates for
the recent past for SARS outbreak are precise as the end of
the epidemic has been reached. The numbers in the later part
of the input series are all zero, granting higher precision and
stability for estimates in the recent past.
Figure 2 gives the observed and fitted daily number of
SARS reported cases from 1 March 2003 to 24 June 2003. The
associated 95% confidence intervals based on the estimates
from the back projection are also presented. Except for a few
outliers, the fitted daily numbers of SARS cases agree well
with the observed ones.
FINDINGS
The estimated SARS infection curve is examined closely in
relating to the major events, preventive measures and
interventions implemented by HKSAR government3 over
the course of the epidemic (see fig 1). The pattern of the
infection curve is in line with the outbreak occurring in
different subgroups of the population. The first infection
wave, which started around 4 March 2003, was due to the
outbreak in one of the large regional hospitals, Prince of
Wales Hospital, which was initiated by the index SARS
patient. He was admitted to the hospital’s ward 8A on
5 March 2003. Subsequently, infections were found in the
area of Shatin District, where the Prince of Wales Hospital is
located, as the virus was not contained in the hospital and got
out into the community. The number of infections decreased
after 10 March 2003, probably because internal preventive
measures were taken in the hospital. It seemed that the
intervention taken within the hospital was effective, as the
incidence continued to fall down until 16 March 2003.
After that, a second wave started at around 16 March 2003
in Amoy Garden, a large residential estate made up of many
individual blocks. This was initiated by a patient who was
treated for chronic renal failure but had been infected by
SARS at Prince of Wales Hospital. He visited Amoy Garden on
14 and 19 March 2003 and used the toilet of his brother’s flat.
It was suspected that this outbreak was caused by environ-
mental hazard—the sewage system. The peak of this
outbreak was reached around 22 March 2003. By 30 March
2003, more than 120 confirmed cases in Amoy Garden were
reported, the government then introduced a mandatory
quarantine and isolation policy for the Amoy Garden
residents at home on 31 March 2003 and 1 April 2003.
After the evacuation, the area was disinfected completely.
However, these measures were implemented nearly at the
end of this outbreak. Before the implementation of the
quarantine policy, many residents from Amoy Garden left
their estate because of the fear of SARS infection and
probably had introduced the virus into the community. Those
residents who moved to the nearby Lower Ngau Tau Kok
Estate II to live with their relatives caused more than 30
people in that estate to be infected. The whole district had
then become seriously affected by the epidemic.
After the second wave, the epidemic had spread through-
out Hong Kong. In the third wave, there were cluster
infections in various hospitals. Two regional hospitals, the
United Christian Hospital and the Princess Margaret
Hospital, which started admitting SARS patients resulting
from the second outbreak around 26 March 2003, both
reported local outbreaks in the hospitals. It was suggested
that the causes were sudden increase in workload of these
hospitals, inadequate protective measures and equipment for
medical and health care workers. A few days later, another
regional hospital, Alice Ho Miu Ling Nethersole Hospital,
reported a local outbreak among the healthcare workers. It
was suspected the outbreak was caused by a SARS patient,
without any symptom, being treated at the hospital. It is
unfortunate that nearly all hospitals that treated SARS
patients had infections among the healthcare workers and
patients. To date, 386 of 1755 infections are medical and
healthcare workers.
On 10 April 2003, home quarantine was implemented for
all households with contacts of confirmed SARS patients.
This preventive measure was implemented before the fourth
wave whose peak was around 17 April 2003. The appearance
of the fourth wave implied that this quarantine measure was
not effective enough in stopping the spread. The failure might
be explained by the fact that there was time lag in confirming
the SARS cases. Those close contacts of these suspected cases
could still spread the virus during the window period because
of the time lag. In the fourth wave, there were probably
cluster infections in various residential buildings, including
in the Shatin District. It was suspected that the cause of
infections was attributable to environmental hazard.
Fortunately, with the experience of the Amoy Garden, the
government responded quickly to disinfect the area and to
monitor the situation closely. These minor outbreaks were
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not allowed to develop like the one in Amoy Garden. The
main component of the fourth outbreak was the infection
within Tai Po District, where the Alice Ho Miu Ling
Nethersole Hospital is located. Unlike the second wave that
took place in Kwun Tong District, over 70% of the outbreak in
Tai Po District spread can be traced back as hospital related.
These included medical and health workers, patients, and
visitors.
From 25 April 2003, the government had extended the
home confinement policy to households with contacts of
suspected SARS patients. In other words, not only those
close contacts with confirmed cases needed to be quaran-
tined, but also those with suspected cases. This remedies the
shortcomings of the previous practice. Except those residual
effects of the dying down process of the epidemic, there was
not any new infection wave after the fourth one. Zero
infections have been estimated for the period after 30 May
2003. It seems that this preventive measure is very effective
in preventing the spread in the community. However, it
should be noted that the later reported cases included
healthcare workers and patients who worked or stayed in
non-high risk wards of the hospitals. It is probably
attributable to the presence of asymptomic SARS patients
as well as the cross infection between the suspected SARS
and the genuine SARS patients in the large observation
wards. Though the government has advised people to seek
medical service in the presence of possible symptoms,
hospitalisation might actually increase the risk to be infected
because of the non-isolation arrangement for SARS sus-
pected inpatients.
Figure 1 Estimated daily number of
infection of severe acute respiratory
syndrome and point wise 95%
confidence intervals in Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region; events3 5
are marked in sequence of time.
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Other preventive measures, like suspension of schools
(since 26 March) and health declaration policy for all coming
people (since 29 March), were taken during the period which
might have contributed to the reduction of the fourth wave.
These preventive measures were helpful in preventing the
spread of the virus in the community to a certain extent, but
they might not be aggressive enough to stop the outbreak in
specific groups.
LIMITATIONS
There may exist reporting delay problem in the reported
series. All cases reported after the cut off time are counted
as cases for the next day. However, there was a change of
cut off time between 1 pm and 3 pm, which may introduce
some inconsistency in the data series. In addition, the
department of health admitted the reporting delay of the
number of cases.4 Any similar delay may also introduce bias
in the estimation. As reporting delay will affect the result of
the back projection method,9 the problem should be re-
assessed whenever sufficient new information becomes
available.
The estimate of the infection curve is affected by the
chosen incubation period distribution. As discussed in
Donnelly et al,5 the infection to onset period distribution
might also contain bias because of the limited number of
observations. In addition, we assumed the number of
reported cases as the number of hospitalisation as the input
series. Actually, we should improve the analysis by using the
number of hospitalisation as it is better matched with the
estimated onset to admission period. However, such data are
not available, only the number of reported cases is available.
Also, another factor—the warm weather that begun in April,
may be contributing to controlling SARS outbreak. However,
this effect is not addressed in this paper.
CONCLUSION
Quarantine of close contacts of confirmed SARS cases seems
to be insufficient as there was time lag for confirmation. The
virus can still be spread in this time lag. The extension of the
quarantine policy to close contacts of both the confirmed and
suspected SARS cases seems to be the most effective
intervention against the spread of the virus in the commu-
nity. The outbreak in hospitals could be contained by better
isolation measures and better protection equipment. As there
are SARS patients admitted to hospitals’ non-high risk wards
without symptoms, the preventive measures should therefore
be implemented in both high risk and non-high risk areas of
the hospitals over the course of the epidemic. Preventing
infections among the medical and health workers is
important in controlling the spread of the epidemic. In case
there is environmental hazard, besides the quarantine policy,
the most effective way to stop the spread is complete
disinfection of the area and the environmental hazard must
be removed.
It is difficult to contain the epidemic once it gets into the
community. It would be most effective to contain SARS at the
beginning by closing down Prince of Wales Hospital to stop
the outbreak to get into community. This outbreak showed
the consequence of failure to implement adequate quarantine
measures in a timely manner. It is a very costly lesson for
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and other coun-
tries. The economic loss for Hong Kong is estimated to be
around HK$ 8 to 10 billions and on top of this, nearly 300
lives. Hong Kong should continue to remove environmental
hazards and promote personal hygiene to minimise the
possible return of SARS in the future.
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